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A B S T R A C T
The relation of the perceptual and the conceptual aspect of human mental states and
process is discussed in light of some recent discussions. Several philosophical argu-
ments for and against the conclusion that perceptual content is a non-conceptual type of
representation are presented and critically assessed. The possibility of an objective criterion
for resolving the issue, independent of introspective reports and intuitive conjectures, is
considered.
Introduction
One of the important features of hu-
man consciousness is the tendency to re-
flect on its own abilities. An old question
that reappears in recent discussions, in-
volving a host of disciplines (from philoso-
phy and psychology to neuro-science), is
about the nature of perceptual experi-
ence. When by casual glance at grandma’s
garden, a plum tree, among many other
things, springs into my visual field, what
kind of experience do I have? Is it a kind
of conceptual affair, say a belief express-
ible through some ordinary language sen-
tence (»Oh, that plum-tree over there!«),
or is it just a phenomenal event: an ele-
mentary, unverbalizable awareness of
something »as such«? What is here at
stake is a possibility of pure (visual or
acoustic or some other) perceptual aware-
ness – that very component of human ex-
perience that is supposed to be void of
any descriptive content.
Several prominent authors find such
possibility obvious, despite none, or very
dubious, evidence in its favor. For, as it is
often claimed, it may just be a fact about
us adult humans that we as a price for
mastering concepts and words, presum-
ably loose the ability to enjoy the pure
qualitative (phenomenal) aspect of our
experiences, not an argument against the
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existence of such an aspect. This is to say,
it may be introspectively difficult to get to
the phenomenal pearl through the con-
ceptual shell, but certainly not disputable
that there exists such a pearl in every
shell, at least when perceptual experience
is at issue. According to such a theory
then, the dilemma about the dependency
or independency of the perceptual from
the conceptual is to be resolved in favor of
the later.
But why should there be a dilemma in
the first place? It could turn out that phi-
losophers are here dealing with no clear-
cut or with poorly grounded dichotomy,
and that both answers could be correct, or
both incorrect. (Indeed, even for the same
reason!) Taking this possibility seriously
we find it productive to reformulate the
original question and ask, on what other
grounds, apart from introspective reports
and intuitive conjectures, is it plausible
to presuppose something like a direct per-
ception of a plum-tree, unmediated by
and independent of higher cognitive abili-
ties like reasoning and believing? Before
answering the question one should be
clear about what should count as a good
answer, and why. Bearing this in mind we
shall present and assess several argu-
ments, which recur in recent discussions,
in favor of each position.
Perceptual Content as
Non-Conceptual Representation
Every sensation when felt has its own
special subjective inner quality. An itch,
visually sensing the quality of redness,
feeling tickling, various kinds of pain –
these are typical examples of pure sensa-
tion. Intrinsic qualities of redness or pain
or tickling are called qualia. There is a
special feeling of »what it is like«1 to un-
dergo such states. Perception is a com-
plex state/event consisting of richly struc-
tured qualia.
There is also a special way what it is
like to be in a state of perception. In cases
of conscious visual perception we are
aware of a scene that appears before us –
of various physical bodies with character-
istic surfaces and arrangement in space:
ones in front of the others, ones left or
right, ones occluding the others, ones abo-
ve the others, etc. According to Peaco-
cke2,3, this mentally represented arrange-
ment of objects in the outer world forms a
perceptual scenario. Perceptual scenario
is constructed through the »filling« along
three axes, which have their »origin« in
the chest of the perceiver. This means
that the content of every perceptive expe-
rience is constructed relative to the per-
ceiver. The axes of the scenario are thus
not to be conceived as being in the outer
world. Nor the parts of the body from
which the axes origin have to be pre-
sented in a sensory way. Each perception
consists in filling the scenario with par-
ticular light reflectances from particular
objects and their backgrounds. A particu-
lar scenario presents some perceptual
content. Thus, as parts of the content of a
visual perception, objects have definite
shape, color and position relative to the
perceiver and to other objects. In case of a
veridical visual perception the content is
thought to represent some state of the
world, typically a portion of the immedi-
ate surrounding or the environment of
the perceiver.
On the other hand, human conscious
life is unthinkable without mental states
such as beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. –
the ones we usually refer to as proposi-
tional mental states or propositional atti-
tudes. What we call thoughts are states
that play crucial roles in processes such
as reasoning and inferring, i.e., in propo-
sitional thinking. Belief, for example, is
an attitude toward some content which is
expressed by the proposition; and propo-
sition is a quasi-linguistic or non-linguis-
tic entity expressed by the sentence in a
natural language. Proposition is the con-
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tent of the sentence. Consider the follow-
ing example of a belief:
»Paul believes that a plum tree blossoms
in grandma’s garden.«
The that-clause is followed by a sen-
tence expressing the proposition, i.e., the
content of the belief. Propositions are
composed of components as sentences are
composed of words. The components of
propositions are concepts. We don’t only
feel and perceive the inner and the outer
world but also conceptualise them. The
proposition »A plum tree blossoms in
grandma’s garden« contains several con-
cepts: »Plum tree«, »Blossom«, »Grandma’s
garden«. We can think about the plum
tree even when we don’t see it. Concepts
are constituents of propositions, and pro-
positions are parts of propositional atti-
tudes, i.e., their content; hence, concepts
figure as parts of propositional attitudes
like, typically, beliefs. The same concepts
serve as constituents in various proposi-
tions and propositional attitudes. On the
basis of meaning of concepts, i.e., their
structured interrelated networks4 based
on their contents, and using the laws of
logic, we infer from propositions and
propositional attitudes to other proposi-
tions and propositional attitudes. This is
aptly expressed by the phrase that con-
cepts are »inferentially promiscuous«4.
For orientation and conduce in all
kinds of worldly situations humans use
data available from all aforementioned
sources or mental faculties. They seem to
differ from each other. As it is often said,
perception occupies the middle ground
between sensations and propositional at-
titudes. With sensations it shares quali-
tative aspects or qualia, with proposi-
tional attitudes the notion of content.
When we see something it seems that
we always see it as something – a com-
mon place of modern philosophy of per-
ception (both phenomenological and ana-
lytic). For example, we see a tennis ball –
round, small, soft, yellow portion of space
– as a tennis ball; but in order to see it as
such we have to learn that it is a tennis
ball: we have to master the concept of a
tennis ball. So it seems that, in addition
to the qualitative characteristics and ar-
rangements, the concept of a tennis ball
is a necessary constituent of this particu-
lar perception, that is if we take it as a
perception of a tennis ball.
However, according to one view of per-
ception, this isn’t so. We do not have to
have a concept of a tennis ball in order to
see »it«. Firstly, filling our internal sce-
nario with the light reflectance from the
surface of the tennis ball, along with the
fillings of the background, do not require,
as it seems, possession or use of any con-
cepts. Specific characteristics of the sur-
face of the tennis ball, due to reflectance,
will be placed within the axes of the sce-
nario relative to the background. The
content of this particular perceptual ex-
perience is thus constituted before and
independent of any conceptualisation. We
do not have to perceive a tennis ball as a
tennis ball; we can experience just the
perceptual content – of an object (»some-
thing out there«) possessing some intrin-
sic color, shape and extension. The pur-
pose of the object could remain comple-
tely unknown to us, or its origin, or any
other specification falling under a des-
criptive category. When we learn what it
is to be a tennis ball, including its neces-
sary conceptual ramifications – that ten-
nis is a game played so-and-so, that the
color of the ball is yellow, that it is made
of rubber, in short, when we grasp a con-
cept of the tennis ball – still there should
be no difference in our perceptual content
of seeing the tennis ball when we see it
again. Our mind now only links the pre-
existing representational content of the
perceptual experience with the newly ac-
quired concept. Hence, the concept is not
to be conceived as a part of the represen-
tational content of visual perception.
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Another powerful argument4 makes
use of the well-known Müller-Lyer illu-
sion5 to illustrate the independence of
perception from its conceptual super-
structure. The drawing consists of two
lines, one exactly above the other. The ar-
rows at both ends of one of the lines
stretch outside the line, the arrows of the
other stretch inside the line. The line
with arrows stretching outside looks lon-
ger then the other line though they are
objectively of the same length. We learn
that the lines are of the same length, we
measure them using measure concepts –
we conceptually become aware that they
are the same. Despite all this, we still see
them as if they were different. If concepts
are part of perception then, as the argu-
ment goes, after changing the concepts by
learning, we should see the scene differ-
ently. But we do not. Therefore, it doesn’t
seem possible to revise the perceptual
content by use of acquired concepts per-
taining to that content4.
Moreover, if seeing is believing, then,
after we come to know that lines are
equally long, and still see them as differ-
ent, we should say that we have a mental
state with a contradictory content of the
form P and not-P. Surely, we cannot pos-
sess such contradictory mental states.
Therefore, a much more plausible expla-
nation is at hand: concepts and beliefs
should not figure as constituents of per-
ception. Therefore, the perceptual con-
tent is non-conceptual. Other arguments
to the same effect can be found in the
literature2–4,6–9.
Consequently, objects that are percep-
tually represented could be represented
conceptually as well. This means, fur-
thermore, that human mind possesses
two general ways of representing objects.
Both of these forms of representations
are independent of each other: constitu-
ents of the one are not constituents of the
other. Nevertheless, they stand in a spe-
cific relation that is established by expli-
cit learning.
The point is that the same content
could be presented in two different ways:
one consists in structured qualitative as-
pects and the other in concepts forming a
proposition. Perception of a plum tree in
blossom has a specific aspectual shape (a
»what-it-is-like« feature), whereby an
occurent propositional attitude per se
does not seem to have such a qualitative
property; the subject is simply conscious
of the propositional content10.
Some Criticisms
Let us invoke an important distinction
introduced by Dretske11 in his account of
conscious experience: the one between
»consciousness of things« and »conscious-
ness of facts«. According to Dretske, one
can be conscious of a plum tree in grand-
ma’s garden and at the same time not be
conscious that it is a plum tree in grand-
ma’s garden. This is because the follow-
ing principle applies:
S is conscious of x 
S is conscious that x is F.
For some people this is a fairly obvious
principle, for Dretske indeed »self-evi-
dent« (sic!). He admits in passing though
»to have discovered, over the years, that
it does not strike everyone that way«.
(One of the authors of this article would
serve as a case in point.) Trying to discard
possible doubt about the validity of the
principle Dretske introduces some fur-
ther distinctions11 (pp. 266–268) under
the assumption that it is the »failure to
appreciate or apply« these distinctions
which is responsible for the scepticism.
We will not discuss his »clarifying distinc-
tions«, since they, on our opinion; add
nothing substantial to the plausibility of
the principle. Of his scarce positive re-
marks11 (pp. 268–269) in support of it,
there is one worth considering.
According to Dretske11 (p. 268–269),
»it seems most implausible to suppose in-
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fants and animals (presumably conscious
of things) have concepts of the rudimen-
tary sort« like being a physical object or
being a thing. He concludes that »if the
concept one must have to be aware of
something is a concept that applies to ev-
erything one can be aware of, what is the
point of insisting that one must have it to
be aware?« But if not concepts, what are
these mental items then? They surely
have some role in structuring experience,
and it is far from clear that this role
amounts to nothing more than a kind of
phenomenal structuring. So it is unclear
what minimal conditions must a descrip-
tive content satisfy to count as a concept
or a propositional item? And even more
important, one has to wonder why
shouldn’t the difference be a matter of
kind and not a matter of degree, starting
from some rudimentary level of propo-
sitionality instantiated by »concepts« like
a thing or physical object. These are
hardly novel issues in philosophy, much
less resolved ones (consider for instance
Frege’s suggestion about Protogedanken,
a kind of primitive propositional attitu-
des attributable to higher animals12).
In the sequel of his article, however,
Dretske uses the above-cited principle
(and a host of examples) to support a fur-
ther – for some authors not less contro-
versial – claim, viz. that one can be con-
scious of something without being
conscious that he is conscious of it. In
fact, this turns out to be Dretske’s pri-
mary concern: a critique of the monitor-
ing or spotlight theory of consciousness,
according to which an ability for intro-
spective awareness, either as phenome-
nal or as propositional awareness, is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient condition for
consciousness:
»An experience of x is conscious, not
because one is aware of the experi-
ence, or aware that one is having it,
but because, being a certain sort of rep-
resentation, it makes one aware of the
properties (of x) and objects (x itself) of
which it is a (sensory) representation.
My visual experience of a barn is con-
scious, not because I am introspecti-
vely aware of it (or introspectively
aware that I am having it) but because
it (when brought about in the right
way) makes me aware of the barn. It
enables me to perceive the barn. (p.
280)11«
There is hardly anything to object to
Dretske’s conjecture. Indeed, introspec-
tive awareness could turn out to be just
one aspect of human consciousness, not
an indispensable one, as it were. But
then, on what grounds can Dretske jus-
tify his principle of independence of the
pure phenomenal awareness from aware-
ness of facts? If the principle seems obvi-
ous to some, and dubious to others, what
other source of evidence is there to count
as relevant for deciding the matter, apart
from the compromised and superfluous
ability of self-monitoring? Dretske leaves
us with no answer.
Daniel Dennett is a prominent sceptic
with regard to seeing/believing dilemma.
He ends one of his articles13 with the fol-
lowing conclusion (p. 172): »the idea that
we can identify perceptual – as opposed to
conceptual – states by an evaluation of
their contents turns out to be an illusion.«
Note that he does not claim that there is
no such thing as pure perceptual experi-
ence, or that the two are so intertwined
that the pure perceptual part (»the gi-
ven«) cannot be discriminated from the
conceptual part (»the taken«). His point is
rather that the issue cannot be resolved
by looking at the contents of the experi-
ence, in an introspective manner.
Unlike Dretske, whose examples are
examples of not seeing (in the sense of
factual seeing) something that is there,
Dennett chooses examples that illustrate
cases of seeing (in the sense of factual
seeing), something that isn’t there. Al-
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though almost all examples are borrowed
from Ramachandran14, I will here cite
Dennett’s original illustration of his own
point. He describes himself marvelling at
the Bellotto’s painting of a landscape in
bright sunlight. Among various details
the painting shows a distant bridge with
individually discernible human figures
walking across it:
»I remember having had a sense that
the artist must have executed these del-
icate miniature figures with the aid of
the magnifying glass. When I leaned
close to the painting to examine the
brushwork, I was astonished to find
that all the little people were merely
artfully positioned single blobs and
daubs of paint – not a hand or foot or
had or hat or shoulder to be discer-
ned.13«
This is a particularly convincing ex-
ample of the problem with the represen-
tation of the content of experience. The
brain represented the blobs of paint as
persons, and, as is metaphorically said,
has »filled in« the details. But how did
this »filling in« exactly happen? It is far
from obvious that the brain neurally rep-
resented all the »non-existing« but »seen«
details of the figures, like (presumably) in
cases of genuine pictorial representation.
It seems rather that some kind of inferen-
tial processes took place, i.e., a kind of
conceptualisation. Besides, the example
shows how the criterion of the richness of
content of representation makes little
sense as a criterion of distinction between
the phenomenal and the propositional.
Towards an Objective Criterion?
It is not unfair to conclude that both
here exposed positions are equally suc-
cessful in handling problems of percep-
tual and conceptual content and the rela-
tion between them. Is there a way to
resolve the matter?
Consider a useful and important dis-
tinction made by Block15,16. He distingui-
shes access-consciousness from phenome-
nal-consciousness. Phenomenal conscious-
ness is simply experience – we referred to
this modality of consciousness as sensa-
tions and perception. Access conscious-
ness is a kind of direct control – some rep-
resentation is access-conscious if it is
poised for direct control of reasoning, re-
porting and action. Block further discus-
ses16 claims of Crick and Koch17,18, and
Pollen19, concerning the neural correlates
of consciousness. Visual area V1 of the
brain is the first major way station that
processes visual signals. The area is not
connected to the frontal cortex, at least
does not »project« to the frontal cortex di-
rectly. Crick’s and Koch’s hypothesis17 is
that frontal parts of the cortex are in-
volved in direct control of reasoning and
decision-making. They assume further-
more that the necessary condition for
some area to be a neural correlate of con-
sciousness is that it directly projects to
frontal areas. From this hypothesis, from
the premise that part of the function of vi-
sual consciousness is exactly to pass on
visual information for the purpose of di-
rect control of reasoning and decision-
making, together with the empirical dis-
covery that V1 is not projected to frontal
cortex, Crick and Koch conclude17 that V1
is not a part of neural correlate of con-
sciousness. Block shows clearly how they,
in fact, conflate phenomenal and access
consciousness. From the fact that V1 is
not directly connected to frontal parts of
the cortex there is no reason to reach a
decisive conclusion that V1 is not a neu-
ral correlate of consciousness. V1 could
subserve phenomenal consciousness or,
what amounts to the same thing, could be
a neural correlate of something else: na-
mely of a particular perceptual scenario.
Of course, if Crick’s and Koch’s findings
and hypotheses are interpreted as access
consciousness, then, assuming that only
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frontal areas subserve direct control of
reasoning and decision-making for beha-
viour, it is apparent that V1, not being
connected to them, is not a part of neural
correlate of access consciousness.
However, Block thinks that there are
two other indications why we could ac-
cept that V1 is not a neural correlate of
consciousness – one is that V1 does not
exhibit the Land effect5 about color con-
stancy which is exhibited in our phenom-
enal consciousness. Briefly, the Land ef-
fect consists in perceiving the same
physical color as qualitatively different,
depending on the background. However,
in reaching this conclusion the fact that
V1 is not connected to the frontal lobes
does not play any role!
On the other hand, Crick and Koch
themselves speculate about the neuronal
circuits involving only the thalamus and
the lower layers below the surface of
about two millimetre thick visual cortex
in the occipital lobe being neuronal corre-
lates of visual consciousness. Frontal
lobes and connections to them are not
proposed as parts of neural correlates of
phenomenal consciousness. It seems the-
refore that frontal lobes are not required
for perception to be conscious.
What can be learned from these argu-
ments? If evidence could be produced that
V1, or the circuits between thalamus and
visual layers in occipital lobe, present the
real neural correlates of consciousness (in
the Block’s sense of phenomenal con-
sciousness), this would then considerably
strengthen the thesis that perception is
non-conceptual. For in that case V1, or
the circuits between thalamus and visual
layers in occipital lobe, would count as
the neural correlate of a visual percep-
tual scenario. As we have emphasized,
filling the scenario, constructing the per-
ceptual content, may not require having
concepts as parts.
It would be worth testing several hy-
potheses concerning the activity of differ-
ent parts of the brain supposedly respon-
sible for the phenomenal, on the one, and
the conceptual aspect of access conscious-
ness, on the other side. This would pres-
ent an objective test of validity of the con-
jecture about the independence of the two
aspects. Moreover, it would be a test of
the instrumental value of this, introspec-
tively grounded, distinction itself.
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PERCEPTIVNI I POJMOVNI SADR@AJ LJUDSKE SVIJESTI:
PERSPEKTIVA FILOZOFIJE UMA
S A @ E T A K
U ~lanku se raspravlja o pitanju odnosa perceptivnog i konceptualnog (pojmovnog)
aspekta mentalnih stanja i procesa. Izlo`eni su i kriti~ki sagledani neki noviji argu-
menti za i protiv pretpostavke da je perceptivni sadr`aj nekonceptualna vrsta repre-
zentacije. Razmotreni su i izgledi za pronala`enje objektivnog kriterija za rje{enje spo-
ra, koji ne bi bio utemeljen na introspektivnim argumentima ili intuiciji.
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